Consciousness Explained or Described?

Consciousness is an unusual phenomenon to study scientifically. It is defined as a subjective, first-person phenomenon, and science is an objective, third-person endeavor. This misalignment between the means—science—and the end—explaining consciousness—gave rise to what has become a productive workaround: the search for ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCCs). Science can sidestep trying to explain consciousness and instead focus on characterizing the kind(s) of neural activity that are reliably correlated with consciousness. However, while we have learned a lot about consciousness in the bargain, the NCC approach was not originally intended as the foundation for a true explanation of consciousness. Indeed, it was proposed precisely to sidestep the, arguably futile, attempt to find one. So how can an account, couched in terms of neural correlates, do the work that a theory is supposed to do: explain consciousness? The answer is that it cannot, and in fact most modern accounts of consciousness do not pretend to. Thus, here, we challenge whether or not any modern accounts of consciousness are in fact theories at all. Instead we argue that they are (competing) laws of consciousness. They describe what they cannot explain, just as Newton described gravity long before a true explanation was ever offered. We lay out our argument using a variety of modern accounts as examples and go on to argue that at least one modern account of consciousness, attention schema theory, goes beyond describing consciousness-related brain activity and qualifies as an explanatory theory

A brain-constrained deep neural-network model that can account for the readiness potential in self-initiated volitional action

The readiness potential (RP) is a gradual buildup of negative electrical potential over the motor cortices prior to onset of a self-initiated movement. It is typically interpreted as having a goal-directed nature, whereby it signals movement planning and preparation. However, a similar buildup can also be observed by averaging continuous random neural fluctuations aligned to crests in their time series [1]. Therefore, an alternative account of the RP is that it reflects ongoing background neuronal noise that has at least a small influence on the precise time of movement onset [2]. While computational modelling studies were used in the past to adjudicate between these accounts, previous attempts did not employ a fully neuroanatomically and neurobiologically realistic architecture, hence falling short of providing a cortical-level mechanistic validation of either theory. Here, we investigated the stochastic origin of the RP by applying a fully brain-constrained deep neural-network model reproducing real cortical neurons dynamics and the structure and connectivity of relevant primary sensorimotor, secondary and association areas of the frontal and temporal lobes. This model has been previously used to account for the neuromechanistic origins and cortical topography of volitional decisions to speak and act [3]. We used the emergent feature of this neural architecture – its ability to exhibit noise-driven periodic spontaneous ignitions of previously learnt internal representations (cell assemblies, CAs, circuits of strongly and reciprocally connected cells distributed across the entire network) – to mimic spontaneous decisions to act as observed in the classical Libet experiment. Specifically, we recorded the network’s activity for 2,000 trials, each trial beginning with a network reset and lasting until the spontaneous ignition of one of the CAs occurred, and used the time interval between trial start and spontaneous CA ignition as a model correlate of waiting times. We found that the model data accounted well for the experimental waiting-time distribution. Furthermore, in line with the stochastic interpretation of the RP, appropriate calibration of the model parameters resulted in subthreshold reverberation of activity within CA circuits, and averaging across cell assemblies’ ignition episodes produced a curve that closely matched the gradual buildup of activity observed in the experimental RP and its onset time. There are various neurophysiological sources of ongoing noise that result from neural activity. Some of this noise might accumulate and reverberate within previously acquired perception-action circuits, and, hence, produce spontaneous action. The present simulation results, obtained with a fully brain-constrained neural architecture, provide further support for this alternative view, placing the classical explanation of the RP further under scrutiny. References 1. Schurger A, Sitt J, Dehaene S. An accumulator model for spontaneous neural activity prior to self-initiated movement. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2012, 109(42), E2904-E2913 2. Schurger A, Mylopoulos M, Rosenthal D. Neural antecedents of spontaneous voluntary movement: a new perspective. TiCS. 2016, 20(2), 77-79 3. Garagnani M, Pulvermüller F. Neuronal correlates of decisions to speak and act: Spontaneous emergence and dynamic topographies in a computational model of frontal and temporal areas. Brain and Language. 2013, 127, 75-85. Eu J Neurosci. 2008, 27(2), 492-51

Precursor processes of human self-initiated action

A gradual buildup of electrical potential over motor areas precedes self-initiated movements. Recently, such "readiness potentials" (RPs) were attributed to stochastic fluctuations in neural activity. We developed a new experimental paradigm that operationalised self-initiated actions as endogenous 'skip' responses while waiting for target stimuli in a perceptual decision task. We compared these to a block of trials where participants could not choose when to skip, but were instead instructed to skip. Frequency and timing of motor action were therefore balanced across blocks, so that conditions differed only in how the timing of skip decisions was generated. We reasoned that across-trial variability of EEG could carry as much information about the source of skip decisions as the mean RP. EEG variability decreased more markedly prior to self-initiated compared to externally-triggered skip actions. This convergence suggests a consistent preparatory process prior to self-initiated action. A leaky stochastic accumulator model could reproduce this convergence given the additional assumption of a systematic decrease in input noise prior to self-initiated actions. Our results may provide a novel neurophysiological perspective on the topical debate regarding whether self-initiated actions arise from a deterministic neurocognitive process, or from neural stochasticity. We suggest that the key precursor of self-initiated action may manifest as a reduction in neural noise

Sensitivity of electrophysiological activity from medial frontal cortex to utilitarian and performance feedback.

A recent study has reported the observation in humans of an event-related brain potential component that is sensitive to the value of outcomes in a gambling task. This component, labeled medial frontal negativity (MFN), was most pronounced following monetary losses as opposed to monetary gains. In this study, we investigate the relationship between the MFN and the error-related negativity (ERN), a component elicited by feedback indicating incorrect choice performance. We argue that the two components can be understood in terms of a recently proposed theory that predicts the occurrence of such scalp negativities following stimuli that indicate that ongoing events are worse than expected. The results from two experiments using a gambling task demonstrate that the sensitivity of the MFN/ERN to the utilitarian and performance aspect of the feedback depends on which aspect is most salient. The results are consistent with the view that the two components are manifestations of the same underlying cognitive and neural process

The Human Touch: Skin Temperature During the Rubber Hand Illusion in Manual and Automated Stroking Procedures

Rohde M, Wold A, Karnath H-O, Ernst MO. The Human Touch: Skin Temperature During the Rubber Hand Illusion in Manual and Automated Stroking Procedures. PLoS ONE. 2013;8(11): e80688.A difference in skin temperature between the hands has been identified as a physiological correlate of the rubber hand illusion (RHI). The RHI is an illusion of body ownership, where participants perceive body ownership over a rubber hand if they see it being stroked in synchrony with their own occluded hand. The current study set out to replicate this result, i.e., psychologically induced cooling of the stimulated hand using an automated stroking paradigm, where stimulation was delivered by a robot arm (PHANToMTM force-feedback device). After we found no evidence for hand cooling in two experiments using this automated procedure, we reverted to a manual stroking paradigm, which is closer to the one employed in the study that first produced this effect. With this procedure, we observed a relative cooling of the stimulated hand in both the experimental and the control condition. The subjective experience of ownership, as rated by the participants, by contrast, was strictly linked to synchronous stroking in all three experiments. This implies that hand-cooling is not a strict correlate of the subjective feeling of hand ownership in the RHI. Factors associated with the differences between the two designs (differences in pressure of tactile stimulation, presence of another person) that were thus far considered irrelevant to the RHI appear to play a role in bringing about this temperature effect

Time perception and the experience of agency in meditation and hypnosis

Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are related in opposing ways to awareness of intentions. The cold control theory of hypnosis proposes that hypnotic responding involves the experience of involuntariness while performing an actually intentional action. Hypnosis therefore relies upon inaccurate metacognition about intentional actions and experiences. Mindfulness meditation centrally involves awareness of intentions and is associated with improved metacognitive access to intentions. Therefore, mindfulness meditators and highly hypnotizable people may lie at opposite ends of a spectrum with regard to metacognitive access to intention‐related information. Here we review the theoretical background and evidence for differences in the metacognition of intentions in these groups, as revealed by chronometric measures of the awareness of voluntary action: the timing of an intention to move (Libet's “W” judgments) and the compressed perception of time between an intentional action and its outcome (“intentional binding”). We review these measures and critically evaluate their proposed connection to the experience of volition and sense of agency

Free will is not a testable hypothesis

Much recent work in neuroscience aims to shed light on whether we have free will. Can it? Can any science? To answer, we need to disentangle different notions of free will, and clarify what we mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘testable’. That done, my main conclusion is, duly interpreted: that free will is not a testable hypothesis. In particular, it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by empirical evidence. The arguments for this are not a priori but rather are based on a posteriori consideration of the relevant neuroscientific investigations, as well as on standard philosophy of science work on the notion of testability

Free will is not a testable hypothesis

Much recent work in neuroscience aims to shed light on whether we have free will. Can it? Can any science? To answer, we need to disentangle different notions of free will, and clarify what we mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘testable’. That done, my main conclusion is, duly interpreted: that free will is not a testable hypothesis. In particular, it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by empirical evidence. The arguments for this are not a priori but rather are based on a posteriori consideration of the relevant neuroscientific investigations, as well as on standard philosophy of science work on the notion of testability

Good vibrations, bad vibrations: Oscillatory brain activity in the attentional blink

The attentional blink (AB) is a deficit in reporting the second (T2) of two targets (T1, T2) when presented in close temporal succession and within a stream of distractor stimuli. The AB has received a great deal of attention in the past two decades because it allows to study the mechanisms that influence the rate and depth of information processing in various setups and therefore provides an elegant way to study correlates of conscious perception in supra-threshold stimuli. Recently evidence has accumulated suggesting that oscillatory signals play a significant role in temporally coordinating information between brain areas. This review focuses on studies looking into oscillatory brain activity in the AB. The results of these studies indicate that the AB is related to modulations in oscillatory brain activity in the theta, alpha, beta, and gamma frequency bands. These modulations are sometimes restricted to a circumscribed brain area but more frequently include several brain regions. They occur before targets are presented as well as after the presentation of the targets. We will argue that the complexity of the findings supports the idea that the AB is not the result of a processing impairment in one particular process or brain area, but the consequence of a dynamic interplay between several processes and/or parts of a neural network

Dynamical Principles of Emotion-Cognition Interaction: Mathematical Images of Mental Disorders

The key contribution of this work is to introduce a mathematical framework to understand self-organized dynamics in the brain that can explain certain aspects of itinerant behavior. Specifically, we introduce a model based upon the coupling of generalized Lotka-Volterra systems. This coupling is based upon competition for common resources. The system can be regarded as a normal or canonical form for any distributed system that shows self-organized dynamics that entail winnerless competition. Crucially, we will show that some of the fundamental instabilities that arise in these coupled systems are remarkably similar to endogenous activity seen in the brain (using EEG and fMRI). Furthermore, by changing a small subset of the system's parameters we can produce bifurcations and metastable sequential dynamics changing, which bear a remarkable similarity to pathological brain states seen in psychiatry. In what follows, we will consider the coupling of two macroscopic modes of brain activity, which, in a purely descriptive fashion, we will label as cognitive and emotional modes. Our aim is to examine the dynamical structures that emerge when coupling these two modes and relate them tentatively to brain activity in normal and non-normal states